Abstract-MORUS is an authenticated stream cipher designed by Wu et al. and submitted for the third-round of the CAESAR competition. The collision properties of MORUS-640-128 are studied. We propose the necessary conditions for an internal state collision after two-step update, i.e., the Hamming weight of the input difference is at least 5 and the difference is distributed in at least three 32-bit words, which provide the theoretical support for MORUS's resistance against collision attack.
INTRODUCTION
Authenticated encryption algorithm [1] combines encryption with authentication, providing both confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously and has been widely used in the security protocols such as SSL/TLS [2] , etc. In order to accelerate the development of authentication encryption, CAESAR competition [3] merges. CAESAR is a large-scale cryptographic competition supported by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) like AES [4] , e-STREAM [5] . With the advance of the competition, authenticated cipher receives more attentions and develops rapidly. The third-round candidates own excellent performance on security and efficiency which are competitive and attract many researchers [6] , [7] , [8] .
MORUS [9] is a notable family of authenticated stream ciphers designed by H. Wu and T. Huang, which has been selected as a third-round candidate of CAESAR competition. By adopting the idea of block cipher, MORUS uses 5 registers of equal length in its internal state and update each state successively. Three MORUS versions: MORUS-640-128, MORUS-1280-128, and MORUS-1280-256 are recommended with different internal state and key sizes. Mileva et al. [10] have proposed a distinguisher attack on MORUS in non-reuse setting. And Zhang et al. [11] researched on the confusion and diffusion properties of the initialization of MORUS. The research on MORUS is relatively limited currently.
Collision attack [12] , [13] is a typical method used in attacking the message authentication. The basic technique is to inject a message difference at certain encryption (or processing the associated date) step and cancel it at a later step.
In this paper, we evaluate the security of authentication by theory deduction. Observations reveal that 32-bit word are not confused completely with internal state. Based on the feature that the 32-bit words in the state element are independent of each other, we utilize the partition method and propose the necessary conditions for an internal state collision after twostep update. There results imply that MORUS resists against collision attack in theory. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the description of MORUS is provided. In Section 3, the distribution of word difference is given. Section 4 discusses the lower bound of difference weight for collision. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. DESCRIPTION OF MORUS MORUS operates four phases: initialization, processing of the authenticated data, encryption, and finalization. In this paper we only focus on the processing of associated data and encryption and study the security of MORUS-640-128. MORUS takes a 128-bit key, a 128-bit nonce, and a tag length less than or equal to 128. More details of MORUS-640-128 can be found in [9] . All the "MORUS" in the rest of this paper refers to "MORUS-640-128". 
A. Notations
The j-th element of the state
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B. The State Update Function of MOURS
MORUS uses five 128-bit registers in its internal state. This function consists of five rounds with similar operations that update the state S. 
; 
The rotation constants , , 0, ,4 i i b w i ,4 for each round are defined in [10] .
C. Processing the Associated Data and Encryption
The Processing the associated data AD of MORUS can be described as follows. adlen means bit length of the associated data, where 128 u adlen .
For i=0 to u-1:
.
The encryption is described as follows. We can obtain the internal state difference Because the collision probability is related to the weight of message difference, we discuss the bit-oriented necessary conditions in this section. Through theory deduction, we complete exhaustion when the weight of message difference is less than or equal to 5.
In the end the experiment results indicate the following conclusion.
Conclusion 2.
For MORUS, when the weight of message difference is less than or equal to 5, there is no collision. Table I . compares the result of this paper with that of designers on collision cryptanalysis. The new idea we used to find the distribution of wordoriented difference for collision is universal, which can be applied to other authenticated ciphers. Moreover, we will evaluate the ability of MORUS in resisting other attacks.
